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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

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Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: July 25, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room/SVTS
TIME: 11:00 a.m. - 12:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on
Bosnia (C)

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR

Sandy Berger

OMB

Gordon Adams

OVPLeon Fuerth
Rick SaundersCIAGeorge Tenet
Dennis BlairSTATEStrobe Talbott
Peter Tarnoff
Jim SteinbergJCSRADM William Owens
LTG Wesley ClarkDEFENSEJohn White
Walter SlocombeSPECIAL ENVOY

Robert Frasure

USUNMadeleine Albright
David SchefferNSC

Alexander Vershbow

Summary of ConclusionsImplementation of London Decisions

1. Deputies reviewed the issues that had arisen in that day's ongoing discussions in the North Atlantic Council regarding implementation of the London decision on Gorazde. They agreed that we could agree to the French proposal that UN authority for Option 1 and 2 air strikes be delegated to the UNPF theater commander, General Janvier, with the expectation that he would delegate authority for close air support to the local commander.

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They agreed that, in light of French opposition to delegating authority for Option 3 air strikes to Janvier, we would agree to defer a NAC decision on the modalities for UN-NATO coordination until the time Option 3 authority was sought. This would be without prejudice to the U.S. position that a decision by UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali was not required. ~~(C)~~

2. Deputies also agreed that the U.S. should oppose UK efforts to require a new NAC decision before attacks could take place against troop concentrations within the Gorazde zone of action (ZOA) under Option 2, as well as UK efforts to limit the size of the ZOA. ~~(C)~~

Contact Group Discussion of Bildt Negotiations

3. Deputies discussed the approach that Ambassador Frasure should take in the July 26 Contact Group meeting to discuss the package negotiated by EU negotiator Bildt with Serbian President Milosevic. They agreed that we should not endorse or provisionally accept the Bildt-Milosevic package but that we needed to take a sufficiently positive stance to encourage continued UK/French support for serious NATO military action. ~~(C)~~

4. Deputies agreed that Ambassador Frasure should inform Contact Group counterparts that we support continued efforts by Bildt, that we believe it essential that Bildt consult further with the Bosnian Government to address their concerns and that we see a need for improvements to the package in the following areas:

- sanctions reimposition mechanism (the U.S. remains opposed a de facto lifting of sanctions in the guise of suspension; we are prepared to continue to work on the idea of a five-nation review panel, but cannot commit to the idea until other aspects of the Bildt-Milosevic package are resolved);
- length of the grace period before reimposition could occur (nine months is clearly too long); and
- the strength of Milosevic's commitments on closure of the Serbian-Bosnian border and acceptance of increased numbers of international monitors.

They agreed that Ambassador Frasure should also underscore that, given the situation on the ground, the negotiations must proceed in tandem with genuine restabilization and de-escalation by the Bosnian Serbs; otherwise it would politically untenable for us to move ahead with a deal with Milosevic. ~~(C)~~

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